

# Torah on Line

A COMPILATION OF INTERNET TORAH SHIURIM

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## Torah Tidbits

### Sedra Stats

10th of 54 sedras; 10th of 12 in B'reishit  
Written on 254.6 lines in a Sefer Torah  
The sedra is a single, long (the longest in the Torah) Parsha (P'tucha, open)  
146 p'sukim - ranks 8th (5th) tied with B'reishit  
2022 words - ranks 3rd (2nd)  
7914 letters - ranks 2nd (first)  
Mikeitz's p'sukim are unusually long for a big sedra. That's why it is so high in the rankings for words and letters.  
Mitzvot - contains none of the 613 mitzvot

### Aliya by Aliya Summary

**Cohen 14 p'sukim - 41:1-14**  
Two years have passed since the wine steward had promised to tell Par'o about Yosef. Extra years of languishing in prison, for putting too much faith in a human at the expense of complete faith in G-d (and possibly creating a Chilul HaShem in Yosef's case, because of who he was). Par'o has two dreams - 7 emaciated cows consuming 7 fat cows without showing the

effect of their "meal", and 7 scorched ears of grain consuming 7 fat, good ears. These dreams upset him very much. He summons his counselors who fail to ease his mood with their unsatisfactory interpretations. The wine steward remembers Yosef and approaches Par'o with his story. "With us therewas this Jewish kid..." Par'o orders Yosef's removal from prison and Yosef is prepared to meet Par'o. [SDT] Rashi points out (actually, he curses) that wicked people, even when they are acknowledging good that was done on their behalf, will belittle those to whom they owe a debt of gratitude. The Wine Steward refers to Yosef as a NA'AR (connotation of a fool), IVRI (a foreigner who doesn't belong amongst us), EVED (a slave unworthy of leadership). [SDT] There is a Tradition that Yosef was "remembered" on Rosh HaShana and removed from prison to the palace of the king. What happened to Yosef was part of the Divine Plan for enslavement and subsequent redemption of Bnei Yisrael. This gives Rosh HaShana one of its claims to be called ZEICHER LITZI'AT MITZRAYIM, commemorative of the Exodus, as we say in Kiddush. [SDT] Meiketz is THE Chanuka sedra. 70.5% of the time, it is read on the single Shabbat Chanuka. 18.4% of the time, it is read on the second of the two Shabbatot Chanuka. Only 10.1% of the time is it not read on Chanuka, but the very next day (as it is this year). But Mikeitz is still THE Chanuka sedra. There is an elaborate REMEZ to Chanuka from Mikeitz that uses It involves the first several p'sukim in the sedra, letter by letter, forming RASHEI TEIVOT, the initial letters of a summary of the laws of Chanuka. The number of words in Mikeitz is given as 2025, which is NER (numeric value of candle) times 8 plus 25 for the 25th of Kislev. (Our count of the words is 2022 - I have no explanation for the discrepancy.) One commentary sees in the description of the scrawny cows devouring the fat cows an allusion to one of the miracles of Chanuka - You gave over the mighty into the hands of the weak.

**Second Aliya - 24 p'sukim - 41:15-38**  
Par'o tells Yosef about his dreams (making

some significant changes which Yosef corrects, thus indicating the Divine origin of his dream interpretations). Yosef tells Par'o that his two dreams are in fact a single message from G-d of His intention to bring seven years of plenty which will be followed by seven years of devastating famine. The years of plenty will not even be remembered (unless measures are taken to properly prepare for them). The doubling of the dream indicates that the events are soon to occur. Yosef suggests what to do during the years of plenty to prepare for the famine. Par'o is highly impressed by the godly person, Yosef.

**Third Aliya - 14 p'sukim - 41:39-52**  
Par'o, convinced that Yosef is the wisest person around, appoints him as viceroy over all of Egypt. Par'o gives Yosef his royal ring and special garments (again garments!) and parades Yosef through the streets so that the Egyptians will know of the authority the king has given Yosef. Yosef is given Osnat as a wife. (Somesay that she was Deena's daughter.) At age 30, Yosef is master over Egypt. Osnat bears Yosef two sons, before the years of the famine - Menashe and Ephraim. Par'o called Yosef TZOFNAT PA'NEI'ACH, not an easy name to explain. Commentaries offer a variety of explanations as to its meaning. In his unique style, R. Yaakov Auerbach z"l, in L'ORA SHEL TORAH, offers a few numeric suggestions, including this one... The name itself equals  $90+80+50+400 (620) + 80+70+50+8 (208) = 828$ . The Torah says "And Yosef, he is the ruler..." (42:6).  $V'YOSEF HU HASHALIT = 6+10+6+60+80 (162) + 5+6+1 (12) + 5+300+30+10+9 (354) = 528$ . Even Par'o recognized that Yosef was instilled with RU'ACH ELOKIM, the Spirit of G-d.  $200+6+8 (214) 1+30+5+10+40 (86) = 300$ . Yosef is the ruler of the land (528) who was guided by the Divine Spirit (300) was  $528+300=828 = TZOFNAT PA'NEI'ACH$ .

**Fourth Aliya - 23 p'sukim - 41:53-42:18**  
The seven years of plenty end and the famine begins. All neighboring countries are devastated by the famine, but Egypt has prepared well. Yosef manages the

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k"z ivfv cus ic v-ht u-vhkt

distribution of food supplies and amasses great wealth for Par'o. Meanwhile, Yaakov, aware that there is food in Egypt, sends "the brothers" to buy provisions. (Only Binyamin remains at home.) [SDT] Actually, the Torah says that Yaakov SAW that there was plenty... Rashi asks: What is the meaning of SAW; would not HEARD have been more accurate? Rashi answers that Yaakov SAW in a prophetic-like vision that there was plenty in Egypt. Rashi adds that this was not full, clear prophecy, as Yaakov still did not SEE that Yosef was on the scene. [SDT] The Gemara in Taanit says that Yaakov and family were still well-supplied with food at this stage in the famine. Yet he sent them to Egypt, rather than inflame the jealousy of others. When others have not, it is improper to flaunt what you have. Yosef sees his brothers, recognizes them, (they do not recognize him,) and remembers his dreams. He treats them harshly and accuses them of being spies. They deny the charges and tell Yosef of their family history and honorable intentions. [SDT] Rashi says that the brothers (unknowingly) uttered a true, prophetic statement when they said "we are all the sons of one man". Consciously, they were talking about themselves. But the statement is very true when Yosef is included - We are ALL... Yosef proposes a test of their sincerity - they must bring their younger brother down to him. He locks them up for 3 days to "think things over". [SDT] B'ZOT - with this you shall be tested. Yosef said that the children of Israel will be tested B'ZOT.  $B'ZOT = 2+7+1+400 = 408$ . The three major "tools" to achieve forgiveness from G-d are T'FILA, T'SHUVVA, TZEDAKA. This is what we say in Musaf of Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur. Some machzorim have another set of words printed above these three. They are not said, but they are there. Prayer = KOL (voice). Repentance is aided by TZOM (fasting). And TZEDAKA is performed with MAMON (money). Each of these three words is numerically equal to 136.  $100+6+30 = 90+6+40 = 40+40+6+50$ . The identical G'matriya of the synonyms speaks of an equality of significance in the quest for Divine forgiveness. Add them up and you find  $136+136+136 = 408$ . B'ZOT TIBACHEINU - This is how we are tested - with Prayer, Repentance, and Acts of Kindness are the Children of Israel tested.

#### **Fifth Aliya - 35 p'sukim - 42:19-43:15**

Yosef tells them that one of them shall remain as a hostage (Yosef selects Shimon, so as to split the dangerous team of Shimon and Levi) and the others are to return to Canaan to bring "the little one" down to Egypt. The brothers express sincere remorse for what they had done to Yosef (considering their present predicament as a punishment for that). Reuven says the equivalent of "I told you so". All are unaware that Yosef is listening

and understanding their conversation. Yosef goes off on his own and weeps (for what he is putting his brothers through). Yosef commands that their bags be filled with food and that their money be returned to them as well. When each brother opens his sack, he is frightened to find his money there. They return to Yaakov and report to him what has happened. Yaakov laments the loss of Yosef and now Shimon and announces that he will not risk losing Binyamin as well. He refuses to permit his sons to return to Egypt, in spite of (or because of) Reuven's ridiculous suggestion that his own sons be put to death if anything happens to Binyamin. [SDT] The Gemara says that the curse of a wise (righteous?) person, even made conditional, comes true (in some way or other). Reuven offered that his sons should die if Binyamin is not returned. The offer was refused. Binyamin did return to his father. Nonetheless, Reuven said something he should not have said. His "two sons" are seen as referring to two famous descendants of Reuven who DID die - Datan and Aviram. One has to be exceedingly careful of what one says! The famine in Canaan intensifies and Yaakov finally agrees to entrust Binyamin into the hands of Yehuda for the return trip to Egypt. Yaakov gives them twice as much money as they will need and sends gifts of the finest spices to the "Egyptian leader". Yaakov blesses his sons; they return to Egypt and present themselves to Yosef.

#### **Sixth Aliya - 14 p'sukim - 43:16-29**

Yosef sees Binyamin and tells his attendant (probably Menashe) to prepare dinner for them all. The brothers fear the summons to Yosef, convinced that it has to do with the returned money from the previous trip. They tell Yosef what had happened in order to forestall his anger. Yosef asks them about their aged father. The brothers bow to Yosef, thus fulfilling the essence of his dreams. Yosef sees Binyamin, asks about him and blesses him.

#### **Seventh Aliya - 22 p'sukim - 43:30-44:17**

Yosef is having a hard time controlling his emotions. He cries in private again, washes his face and returns to the brothers. At the dinner he seats his brothers in age order (which alarms them - "How could he know?"). He gives them gifts, more to Binyamin. (Yosef was creating the potential for jealousy so that the brothers would be put into a similar situation as previously. This sets the stage for "complete" repentance.)

He next orders that food and their money be put into their respective sacks and that his (Yosef's) special cup be placed among Binyamin's baggage. He sends the brothers on their way to Canaan, and then sends his "man" after them to accuse them of stealing the cup. The brothers are appalled by the accusation and pledge that if the cup is found with them, the "guilty" party shall

be put to death and the others would become slaves to Yosef. Yosef offers to enslave only the guilty one; the others would be free to go. The search reveals that Binyamin has the cup. Yehuda, as spokesman, offers that all should become slaves. Yosef insists that only Binyamin should remain; the others should return to their father. Once again, the brothers can go to Yaakov - without one of Rachel's sons and claim extenuating circumstances. The potential for real T'shuvva. Will the brothers see this as an opportunity to save themselves and claim that they were powerless to do anything, or will they stand up to this enigmatic ruler of Egypt and be prepared to fight for Binyamin. In classic "cliffhanger" style, the parsha ends with this question. One must stay tuned to the same station, same time next week, for the answer. And they drank together and got drunk. On this, Rashi says that neither the brothers nor Yosef drank wine from the day of the Sale of Yosef until this day of family reunion. In discussing this Rashi with Rabbi Chaim Eisen, he mentioned that he could understand why Yosef was joyful enough to drink wine once again, but why would the brothers? Perhaps they felt fearful of offending their fickle host, or perhaps they were glad to find Shimon intact.

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### TORAH WEEKLY

From Ohr Somayach <[ohr@ohr.edu](mailto:ohr@ohr.edu)>

#### OVERVIEW

It is two years later. Pharaoh has a dream. He is unsatisfied with all attempts to interpret it. Pharaoh's wine chamberlain remembers that Yosef accurately interpreted his dream while in prison. Yosef is released from prison and brought before Pharaoh. He interprets that soon will begin seven years of abundance followed by seven years of severe famine. He tells Pharaoh to appoint a wise person to store grain in preparation for the famine. Pharaoh appoints him as viceroy to oversee the project. Pharaoh gives Yosef an Egyptian name, Tsafnat Panayach, and selects Osnat, Yosef's ex-master's daughter, as Yosef's wife. Egypt becomes the granary of the world. Yosef has two sons, Menashe and Ephraim. Yaakov sends his sons to Egypt to buy food. The brothers come before Yosef and bow to him. Yosef recognizes them but they do not recognize him. Mindful of his dreams, Yosef plays the part of an Egyptian overlord and acts harshly, accusing them of being spies. Yosef sells them food, but keeps Shimon hostage until they bring their brother Binyamin to him as proof of their honesty. Yosef commands his servants to

replace the purchase-money in their sacks. On the return journey, they discover the money and their hearts sink. They return to Yaakov and retell everything. Yaakov refuses to let Binyamin go to Egypt, but when the famine grows unbearable, he accedes. Yehuda guarantees Binyamin's safety, and the brothers go to Egypt. Yosef welcomes the brothers lavishly as honored guests. When he sees Binyamin he rushes from the room and weeps. Yosef instructs his servants to replace the money in the sacks, and to put his goblet inside Binyamin's sack. When the goblet is discovered, Yosef demands Binyamin become his slave as punishment. Yehuda interposes and offers himself instead, but Yosef refuses.

#### INSIGHTS SEVENS AND EIGHTS

"Out of the river there emerged seven cows..." (41:2)

The Torah portion Miketz almost always falls during the week of Chanukah. This year it is read after the end of the festival. For Miketz to fall after Chanukah, three events have to coincide: Rosh Hashana must fall on a Shabbat, and both the months of Cheshvan and Kislev must have only 29 days instead of 30.

There is obviously a very strong link between the portion of Miketz and Chanukah.

At the beginning of this week's reading, Pharaoh has a dream about seven cows coming up from the river. These cows were healthy looking, robust, full of flesh. After them emerged seven other cows. These cows were gaunt and ugly. The gaunt ugly cows ate the fleshy cows and left no trace of them.

Egyptian life was dominated by the Nile. To the extent that the Nile overflowed its banks, to that same degree would there be prosperity and food in Egypt. For this reason, the Egyptians worshipped the Nile. On its vagaries depended life and death.

Seven cows emerged from the Nile. Seven is the number which connotes this-worldliness. There are seven colors in the rainbow; seven notes in the diatonic scale; seven days in the week.

Chanukah is the festival where we celebrate eight; when we connect to that which is beyond this world. Chanukah is where we take one step beyond. The one flask of pure oil that is found in the Holy Temple can only burn for one day, but it burns for eight whole days. It is not just a miracle -- but a miracle of eight.

The idolatry of Egypt was to take the natural world, the Nile, the world of seven, and worship it. To take nature and make into a god. As Pharaoh said to Moshe: "Who is Hashem? I do not know Hashem..." (Shemot 5:2) Pharaoh recognized that there was a "god" in the world, but he only recognized a god of nature. In Hebrew the word "Elokim" -- G-d -- has the same gematria (numerical

equivalent) as hateva which means "Nature." When we make nature a supernatural force, we take the world of seven and make that into eight.

In a regular year where Miketz does occur during Chanukah, the haftara read is Zechariah 2:14-4:7. Zechariah is shown a vision of a menorah made entirely of gold, complete with a reservoir, tubes to bring it oil and two olive trees to bear olives.

A complete self-supporting system. The symbolism is that Hashem provides a system which supports us continuously. However, we have to open our eyes to see where that support is coming from. To remind ourselves that Mother Nature has a Father.

#### HAFTARAH: Melachim II 3:15 - 4:1 ON THE CUTTING EDGE

The king said, "This one claims: 'This is my son who is alive, and your son is the dead one,' and this one claims: 'It is not so! Your son is the dead one, and my son is the living one.'" ... "Cut the living child in two and give half to one and half to the other." (3:23-25)

It is usually assumed that King Solomon ordered the baby to be cut in half in order to determine the real mother.

In reality, it was already clear to the king who was the true mother from the way the two women had expressed themselves:

The first one started by saying "This is my son who is alive" and only then "and your son is dead;" whereas the second mother commenced her claim by saying "Your son is the dead one" and only afterwards said that "my son is the living one."

The second woman, who was lying, wasn't really interested in getting the living child, for why should she want to expend the considerable effort of raising a child which wasn't really hers. Rather, out of jealousy alone, she wanted to prevent the other woman from keeping the living child.

For that reason her focus was on "Your child is dead," rather than "My son is the living one," since her whole point was to prove the dead child belonged to someone else.

On the other hand, the real mother was only concerned to prove that her child was alive.

>From these tell-tale subconscious hints, King Solomon was able to discern the true mother. It was only to prove to the world that his analysis was accurate that he went through the theatrics of calling for the sword to divide the living child, knowing that the real mother would far prefer that the child should live, even if it meant having to give him up.

However Solomon, the wisest of men, had already arrived at the truth of the matter as soon as the two women had opened their mouths.

\* Kochav M'Yaakov in Mayana shel Torah

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## PARSHA Q&A

From Ohr Somayach <ohr@ohr.edu>

KASHA! (kasha means "question") How would you answer this question on the Parsha?

Sue (Shoshana) Zakar <suezakar@clark.net> wrote:

When Rachel was hiding the idols she took from Lavan's house, and Lavan came looking for them, Yaakov said that whoever they were found with would die. Since Rachel indeed did die early, this is used as proof that the curse of a tzaddik (righteous person), even if unintentional, has an effect. A similar situation occurred when Yosef planted his goblet in Binyamin's sack and Yehudah said that the person in whose possession it was found would not live. Did Binyamin die at an early age? If not, then what was the difference between the two situations? I've asked a number of people, including several rabbis, about this and no one has found a definitive answer. I'm hoping you can help.

Dear Sue (Shoshana) Zakar, Rachel actually took her father's idols, whereas Binyamin had not taken the goblet -- it had been placed in his sack without his knowledge. Yehuda's intention was only for whoever took the goblet. Another difference between the two cases is that immediately after Yehudah uttered his curse, Yosef's servant refuted it by saying it should not come to fruition. This is in keeping with the rule that a statement is null if it is retracted immediately. Yaakov's curse, however, was never retracted.

\* Sefer Haparshiot

#### ANSWERS TO THIS WEEK'S QUESTIONS

All references are to the verses and Rashi's commentary, unless otherwise stated

1. What did the fat cows being eaten symbolize? 41:4 - That all the joy of the plentiful years would be forgotten. (Not that the good years would provide food for the bad years.)
2. How did Pharaoh's recollection of his dream differ from Nevuchadnetzar's recollection of his dream? 41:8 - Pharaoh remembered his dream but didn't know its meaning. Nevuchadnetzar forgot his dream.
3. What was significant about the fact that Pharaoh dreamed repeatedly? 41:32 - It showed that the seven good years would start immediately.
4. What does "Tsafnat Panayach" mean? 41:45 - He who explains things that are hidden and obscure.
5. What happened to the Egyptians' grain that was stored in anticipation of the famine? 41:55 - It rotted.

6. What did Yosef require the Egyptians to do before he would sell them grain? 41:55 - Become circumcised.

7. Did Yaakov and his family still have food when he sent his sons to Egypt? If yes, why did he send them? 42:1 - Yes, but he sent them because he did not want to cause envy in the eyes of those who did not have food.

8. What prophetic significance lay in Yaakov's choice of the word "redu" -- "descend" (and not "lechu" -- "go")? 42:2 - It hinted to the 210 years that the Jewish people would be in Egypt: The word "redu" has the numerical value of 210.

9. Why does the verse say "Yosef's brothers" went down to Egypt (and not "Yaakov's sons")? 42:3 - Because they regretted selling Yosef and planned to act as brothers by trying to find him and ransom him at any cost.

10. When did Yosef know that his dreams were being fulfilled? 42:9 - When his brothers bowed to him.

11. Under what pretext did Yosef accuse his brothers of spying? 42:12 - They entered the city through 10 gates rather than through one gate.

12. Why did the brothers enter the city through different gates? 42:13 - To search for Yosef throughout the city.

13. Who was the interpreter between Yosef and his brothers? 42:23 - His son Menashe.

14. Why did Yosef choose specifically Shimon to put in prison? 42:24 - Because he was the one who cast Yosef into the pit and who said, "Here comes the dreamer." Or, to separate him from Levi, as together they posed a danger.

15. How does the verse indicate that Shimon was released from prison after his brothers left? 42:24 - The verse says Shimon was bound "in front of their eyes," implying that he was bound only while in their sight.

16. What was Yaakov implying when he said to his sons: "I am the one whom you bereaved?" 42:36 - That he suspected them of having slain or sold Shimon, and that they may have done the same to Yosef.

17. How did Reuven try to persuade Yaakov to send Binyamin to Egypt? 42:37 - He said: "Kill my two sons if I fail to bring back Binyamin."

18. How long did it take for Yaakov and family to eat all the food that the brothers brought back from Egypt? Give the answer in terms of travel time. 43:2,10 - Twice the travel time to and from Egypt.

19. How much more money did the brothers bring on their second journey than on their first journey? Why? 43:12 - Three times as much, to repay the money they found in their sacks and to buy more even if the price had doubled.

20. How did the brothers defend themselves against the accusation of theft? 44:8 - They said "We returned the money

we found in our sacks; can it be that we would steal?"

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### WEEKLY-HALACHA

From Jeffrey Gross <jgross@torah.org>  
By Rabbi Doniel Neustadt

A discussion of Halachic topics related to the Parsha of the week. **For final rulings, consult your Rav.**

#### MUKTZEH ITEM LEFT ON A BED

QUESTION: What can be done if a telephone or a camera is mistakenly left on a bed or chair before Shabbos, and one needs the bed or chair on Shabbos?

DISCUSSION: To answer this question, we must break it down into its components: 1) What type of muktzeh are such objects? 2) Are they the type that can be moved under certain circumstances? 3) If they are the type that cannot be moved, is there any other way to deal with them? 4) Does the issue of basis apply here?

#### TYPES OF MUKTZEH

There are basically two kinds of muktzeh. We will refer to them as severe muktzeh (chamur) and light muktzeh (kal):

Severe muktzeh includes items which are "set apart" before Shabbos because they will definitely not be used on Shabbos. Severe muktzeh includes items which are classified as "non-utensils", such as a rock, as well as items which are classified as "delicate" or "precision" utensils, such as a ritual slaughterer's knife, which will not, of course, be used for slaughtering on Shabbos, nor will it be used for any permitted activity because it is so easily damaged;

Light muktzeh ??includes items which are set apart because they are normally used for activities which are prohibited on Shabbos, but may, on occasion, be used for a permitted Shabbos activity, e.g., scissors.

#### WHAT PRACTICAL DIFFERENCES IS THERE BETWEEN THE TWO TYPES?

The main difference between the two types of muktzeh is that light muktzeh can be moved [in a normal manner] under certain circumstances while severe muktzeh cannot. The circumstances under which light muktzeh can be moved are a) if the muktzeh item is needed in order to perform a permissible activity, or b) if the place which the muktzeh item occupies is needed in order to perform a permissible activity.

Let us explain:

In order to perform a permitted activity: A hammer, a typical light muktzeh, may be used in order to crack nuts. A sewing needle, another light muktzeh, may be used to remove a splinter from one's finger. Since nut-cracking and splinter removal are permitted activities, a light muktzeh item

may be used. [The poskim(1) note, however, that light muktzeh should only be employed when no other suitable item is readily available. Therefore, if a nutcracker and a hammer are equally accessible, the nutcracker should be used. There is no need, however, to borrow a nutcracker if a hammer is available.]

If the place which the muktzeh item occupies is needed: If a tool was left on a bed and the bed is needed for sleeping, or if scissors were left on a chair and the chair is needed for sitting, the light muktzeh item may be picked up and removed, since the muktzeh article is in the way of a need which is permitted to be met on Shabbos. Also, if the light muktzeh is in the way of a permitted item, e.g., a hammer is on a bookshelf and it is blocking a book, it is permitted to move the hammer in order to reach the book. [It is highly questionable if one is allowed to move a light muktzeh item which is simply creating a clutter but not actually interfering with a permissible activity, e.g. a hammer left lying on a mantel. Most contemporary poskim do not allow moving a muktzeh item for this reason(2).]

#### SMALL APPLIANCES - WHAT TYPE OF MUKTZEH ARE THEY?

There are two reasons as to why a telephone or a camera may be classified as severe muktzeh: Delicate or fragile items - While these small appliances are not as delicate as a slaughterer's knife, they are still fragile electronic devices which are handled carefully and not used for any purpose other than the one for which they are manufactured. Possibly, they can be classified as a muktzeh machmas chisaron kis(3); No permissible use on Shabbos - Some poskim maintain that in order for a utensil to retain its status of light muktzeh, it must have some possible permissible use on Shabbos as do a hammer, a comb or a phone book, for example. These items are light muktzeh because they have various uses, some permitted on Shabbos and some not. But an object like a candlestick, which can be used only for a forbidden activity, can no longer be considered light muktzeh. Small appliances such as those in question have no permitted use on Shabbos. There is nothing that can be done with a telephone except making calls, an activity which is prohibited on Shabbos.

Not all poskim, however, agree that a light muktzeh object must have a possible use on Shabbos(4). Mishnah Berurah does not give a clear-cut ruling on this issue(5). Several contemporary poskim(6) rule that under extenuating circumstance one may be lenient and consider these items as light muktzeh.

Concerning our case, therefore, we have established two points: 1) The small appliances in question may be considered severe muktzeh; 2) Severe muktzeh may not be moved, even if the place which it occupies is needed for a permitted activity. It follows, therefore, that the telephone,

etc., cannot just be picked up and removed from the bed or chair.

**MOVING VIA "BODY" - IS IT AN OPTION?**  
In the opinion of the majority of the poskim(7), even severe muktzeh may be moved by means of one's body, which means moving the object by employing any part of the body except for the hand. When necessary(8), one can move all types of muktzeh using the foot, head, mouth(9), teeth, elbow(10), or any other part of the body(11).

Although theoretically this option can be exercised, it has virtually no practical application. There is no practical method for kicking or shoving a telephone without taking the receiver off the hook, in violation of a strict - possibly Biblical - prohibition. While this particular violation does not apply to a camera, it is still not practical to shove or kick a camera from the bed to the floor, since doing so would likely ruin the camera.

**IS "INDIRECT MOVEMENT" AN OPTION?**  
Indirect movement means using a non-muktzeh item to move a muktzeh item. In our case, it would mean pulling at the blanket which automatically - but "indirectly" - moves the telephone. In the opinion of the Mishnah Berurah(12) and most poskim, indirect movement is permitted when it is being done for a permissible purpose but not when it is done for the sake of the muktzeh item. For instance, indirectly moving a camera off the bed or chair in order to protect it, i.e., for the sake of the camera, is prohibited. If, as in our case, the camera is moved [via the blanket] so that the bed or chair can be used, it is permitted.

This leniency, however, is not agreed upon by all poskim. Chazon Ish(13) rules clearly that indirect movement is prohibited in this case. In his opinion, indirect movement is permitted only when the permitted item is being moved for its own sake, and the muktzeh is inadvertently being carried along with it. But if the purpose is to move the muktzeh, even if ultimately one will use the bed on Shabbos - a permitted activity - it is prohibited to move the muktzeh.

It seems, though, that even the Chazon Ish would agree that the following case is permitted: If there is a bedspread on the bed which needs to be removed before one can sleep in the bed, then the camera is being indirectly moved in a permitted manner. Even when there is no bedspread, but the blanket is folded down [as is normally done] to get the bed ready for sleeping, and the camera is indirectly moved as the blanket is folded down, it may be permitted according to all views.

**IS THE BASIS ISSUE A PROBLEM?**

Basis, lit. a base, is any object which severe muktzeh was placed on before Shabbos. While the laws of basis are complicated, the basic rule is that the basis cannot be moved even if somehow the muktzeh item is no longer on it. Were a blanket or a bed a basis, then even if

somehow the telephone or camera were removed from the bed [either by body movement or indirect movement, or by a non-Jew or a baby(14)] it would still be prohibited to use the bed, since it had served as a base for the muktzeh, which in turn, made the base itself muktzeh.

The blanket and bed in our case, however, do not become a basis. A base can only be a basis if the muktzeh was purposely placed on it before Shabbos, with the intention of leaving it there for Shabbos(15). In our case, though, the telephone, etc., was left there by mistake, so the chair or bed does not become a basis. If we can figure out a way to remove the muktzeh, the blankets and bed themselves will be permitted to be used.

**WHAT TO DO?**

In conclusion, there is no one solution for all cases. Sometimes "body movement" or "indirect movement" will solve the problem, but not always.

In a situation when no other bed is available or accessible, there is some room for leniency. An argument can be made that a telephone, etc., is not severe muktzeh at all, which will allow one to move it when the place it occupies is needed. We have previously stated that, under extenuating circumstances, contemporary poskim rely on the lenient view concerning items which have no permissible use. Having no other bed to sleep on is definitely an extenuating circumstance.

Concerning the halachic definition of a telephone, etc., as a delicate and fragile object, this definition is subject to the quick-changing pace of modern technology which can reformulate once delicate and fragile appliances into durable, unbreakable ones. Thus it is difficult to determine what is at the moment muktzeh machmas chisaron kis, severe muktzeh, and what is not. As is true here and in all similar cases, one should consult his rav for an actual ruling.

**FOOTNOTES:**

1 Mishnah Berurah 308:12, as explained by Igros Moshe O.C. 5:21-12.

2 Igros Moshe O.C. 5:22-31, Harav S. Y. Elyashiv (Shalmei Yehudah, pg. 11) and Az Nidberu 8:30 are stringent on this issue. See, however, Machazeh Eliyahu 46 who rules leniently.

3 Harav Y.S. Elyashiv (Shalmei Yehudah, pg. 41).

4 See Pri Megadim (Eishel Avraham 308:12), Aruch ha-Shulchan 279:1; 308:23 and Chazon Ish 44:13 who rule stringently, while Tosfos Shabbos 308:29 and Igros Moshe O.C. 5:22-28,32 do not.

5 See 308:34 quoting Mor u'Ketzia and Sha'ar ha-Tziyun 279:4 based on Magen Avraham.

6 Harav S.Z. Auerbach and Harav Y.S. Elyashiv (Shalmei Yehudah, pg. 19); Shevet ha-Levi 2:32; Az Nidberu 8:67; Zachor v'Shamor 41:4.

7 Mishnah Berurah 308:13; 309:14; 311:30; Beir Halachah 266:13. See Minchas Shelomo 1:14-2.

8 Igros Moshe O.C. 5:22-6. Note that Chazon Ish O.C. 47:13 does not agree with this leniency; in his opinion there is no difference between moving muktzeh with the hand or any other part of the body.

9 Includes blowing; Rama 308:3.

10 Or back of the hand; Mishnah Berurah 276:31.

11 Note that the leniency of using the body applies only to objects which are normally moved by hand. If this object is normally moved by the body, the leniency does not apply; see Mishnah Berurah 308:62.

12 O.C. 311:8.

13 O.C. 47:14; see Minchas Shelomo 1:14-2. [This may be the view of Shulchan Aruch Harav 308:60 as well.]

14 Although a non-Jew or baby cannot be instructed to remove the muktzeh, they might do so on their own.

15 O. C. 309:4.

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## SEDRAH SELECTIONS

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PARSHAS MIKEITZ 5761 BS"D  
L'ILUY NISHMAS OVI MORI R' CHAIM  
B"R SIMCHOH Z"L HK"M

Ch. 41, v. 25: "Asher hoElokim oseh HIGID I'Paroh" - Compare these words about the robust cows with what was said in verse 28 about the emaciated cows, "Asher hoElokim oseh HEROH es Paroh." Rabbi Shlomo Kluger in Imrei Shefer explains that it is natural to directly communicate good tidings. However, if it is necessary to convey negative news, an attempt is usually made to do so indirectly, so as to somewhat deflect the severity of the news. The dream of the seven robust cows portended seven years of abundance, hence HIGID, Hashem directly told Paroh. The dream of the seven emaciated cows foretold of seven years of famine, and this negative news is expressed as HEROH, shown, but not told directly. In a similar vein, a nuance of change in expressions when Yoseif interpreted the dreams of the wine butler and the baker can also be explained. In 40:12 when responding to the dream of the wine butler the verse says "Va'yomer Yoseif," while in 40:18 when responding to the baker it says "Va'yaan Yoseif. The P'ninim Mishulchan Govoah says in the name of R' Moshe Landinski, the Rosh ha'Yeshivoh of Radin, that the response to the wine butler was a positive one, as not only would his life be spared, but he would even regain his former

position. This response required no prompting. Yoseif readily interpreted it, hence "Va'YOMER Yoseif." However, when it came to interpreting the dream of the baker, which had a very negative outcome, Yoseif was most reluctant to respond. Hence it is expressed in verse 18 as "Va'YAAN Yoseif," Yoseif RESPONDED, only when being pressed for an answer, and did not voluntarily reply. Perhaps according to this line of reasoning a few other differences in the verses can be explained. Here in 41:25 we have "higid L'Paroh," TO Paroh, while in verse 28 we have "he'roh ES Paroh." The letter Lamed indicates "directly to," while ES in verse 28 indicates a secondary form, not advising Paroh directly, since it was bad news. Also in parshas Va'yeishev, in 40:12 we have "Va'yomeir LO Yoseif," directly to him, and in 40:18 we find "Va'yaan Yoseif va'yomer," without the word LO, indicating that Yoseif answered, but not directly to the baker, seemingly talking to the air and allowing anyone to hear. Again, this is because he did not want to directly deliver the negative interpretation.

Ch. 41, v. 31: "V'lo yivoda hasovo bo'oretz mipnei horo'ov hahu achar'ei chein" - The placing of the words "achar'ei chein" at the end of the verse seems to indicate that during the time of abundance, the bountiful crop would not be appreciated because of the hunger that would come afterwards. If the intention of the verse was to say that there would be an abundance that would afterwards be forgotten because of the devastating famine following it, the words "acharei chein" should be placed at the beginning of this verse, stating "V'lo yivoda hasovo bo'oretz achar'ei chein mipnei horo'ov hahu." Another difficulty that can be raised is, if the bountiful years would be forgotten even at the end of the first year of famine as indicated in 47:18, "Vatitome hashonoh ha'hee," why in the dream were there seven emaciated cows that swallowed the seven robust ones with no noticeable change in their girth, indicating that seven years of hunger would eradicate any vestige of the plentiful years? Should not ONE COW have swallowed the seven cows, as the first year of famine eradicated all the memories of plenty of the previous seven years, albeit there should be seven emaciated cows in the dream to indicate seven years of hunger? Lastly, the well known question on this story: Yoseif was only asked to interpret the dream, but not to offer advice as to how to handle the situation, so why did he venture into a realm that was not his? Rabbi Dovid Tevel, author of Nachalas Dovid, offers an answer to these three questions. As the Torah relates, the populace was required to put aside a portion of the produce during the years of bumper crops to assure an ample supply for the famine years. Our verse tells us that the concern for putting away a large amount put a severe damper on the consumption even during the years of

plenty. This is why the verse places "achar'ei chein" at the end. The intention of these words is to say that even during the plentiful years "lo yivoda hasova." This also explains why in the dream there were seven cows that swallowed seven cows. This was not only to indicate that the hunger of later would eradicate any vestige of the plenty of earlier, but to indicate the concern lurking in everyone's mind about the impending seven years of famine, destroyed the enjoyment of the first seven years while they were living through those seven bountiful years, hence SEVEN COWS swallowed the seven robust cows. Lastly, since this was part and parcel of the dream, it indicated that there would be austerity even DURING the years of plenty, thus indicating that a strategy should be put into place to set aside much food for later, and as such is an intrinsic part of the dream, and not Yoseif's taking matters into his own hands and offering unasked for advice. The third question raised above, regarding Yoseif's offering advice, while he was only requested to interpret the dreams, has many answers. If anyone wants to submit answers, perhaps they would be posted next week.

Ch. 41, v. 38: "Hanimtzo CHO'ZEH ish" - The word CHO'ZEH seems to indicate that Paroh was pointing to someone else who was similar to Yoseif, or else the word CHOMOHU or CH'YOSEIF would have been used. The Medrash relates that Paroh's officers said that they would not allow him to elevate a jailbird to such a high position. Paroh countered by saying that Yoseif was from a family of high stature. He proved it by saying that in his private chamber he had a drawing in the likeness of Soroh, as when she was in Egypt, Paroh was quite taken with her beauty and had a likeness of her made. Yoseif, her descendant looked quite similar to his great-grandmother Soroh, and Paroh pointed to the drawing of Soroh, and expressed himself with CHO'ZEH, similar to this picture of Soroh. The Holy Zohar (Shmos pg. 29) writes that Paroh had a wooden statue made in the likeness of Soroh.

Ch. 41, v. 45: "Vayikroh Paroh sheim Yoseif Tzofnas Paa'nei'ach" - It was a good thing that this idea entered Paroh's mind because otherwise if left as Yoseif, his brothers would have caught on to his identity. (A'keidas Yitzchok and Chasam Sofer)

Ch. 41, v. 45: "Vayiten lo es Osnas bas Poti Phera kohein On l'ishoh" - Why did Paroh become a match-maker? (This question is exacerbated with the knowledge that Yoseif had just emerged from jail and there was no hope of receiving even one penny for shadchonus.) The Rokei'ach gives three answers. (The no shadchonus payment is not part of his question.) 1) So that Poti Phera should not take him back as a slave. He would never do such a thing to his son-in-law. He adds that Poti Phera

gave Yoseif a writ of freedom, emancipating him from further slavery. 2) This would remove any vestiges of negative rumours that Yoseif was guilty of making advances to the wife of Poti Phera. If it were true, the last thing Poti Phera would want is to have Yoseif as a son-in-law, giving him ample opportunity to spend time in his in-laws' home and again assault Poti Phera's wife. 3) So that people would accept Yoseif's leadership. Since he was known as a slave until now, it would be unbecoming for them to have him as a ruler. By marrying the daughter of such a highly placed minister, people would realize that Yoseif was of a high social stratum and was incorrectly sold as a slave. 4) The Oznyaim laTorah offers answers 1 and 2 above and also offers another answer; to create the aura of Yoseif's bring a local citizen. He would not readily accepted as a person of authority if considered a foreigner. This would be alleviated if he were married to a local woman. This is indicated by the last words of this verse, "va'yetzai al eretz Mitzrayim," after having married Osnos, a girl who grew up locally, Yoseif was able to rule over the land of Egypt.

Ch. 41, v. 54: "Va'yhi ro'ov b'chol ho'arotzos" - "B'chol ho'arotzos," when taken literally, means "in ALL the lands." However, the M.R. 90:6 says that outside of Egypt only three lands were affected, Phoenicia, Arabia, and Palistinia. Rabbi Avrohom ben hoRambam writes in the name of (Rabbi Yishmo'eil) ben Chofni that "all the lands" refers to all the lands that had a climate similar to that of Egypt.

Ch. 42, v. 9: "M'raglim atem LIROSE es ervas ho'oretz BO'SEM" - We find the word LIROSE at the beginning of Yoseif's accusation that the brothers were spies, before the word BO'SEM. Compare this with Yoseif's reiterating his claim in verse 12, "Lo, ki ervas ho'oretz BO'SEM LIROSE," where the word LIROSE appears at the end of the accusation, after BO'SEM. The Rokei'ach answers this with the words of the M.R. 91:6 that the conversation between Yoseif and his brothers went as follows: Yoseif told them that through his divining with his unique goblet he became aware that they travelled to Mitzrayim as a group, and just before entering the city they split up, each entering through a different gateway. This is clearly indicative of espionage, as they wanted to scout out the city to see its weakest points of security, so as to allow for a successful attack. The brothers responded that they were all sons of one man (verse 11), and as such, their father advised them to not enter through one gateway, as they would be subject to an "ayin hora," an evil eye. Yoseif responded that he did not accept this excuse, as he also was apprised that they descended upon the brothel area of town, where the lowlifes come together and for a few dollars could easily be coerced into spilling the secrets of the country. Again

this is an indication of espionage intentions. The brothers responded that they went there in search of a missing item, which they did not disclose. They made up their minds to attempt to recover Yoseif, and figured that in all likelihood he was sold to Mitzrayim, and if so would presumably have been put to use in a brothel, as he was strikingly handsome. They were not ready to admit this to Yoseif, and this circumstantial evidence stood against them. The Rokei'ach says that we now understand the change in position of the word LIROSE in these two verse. The earlier verse was the claim that they entered through different gateways. This is expressed by "LIROSE es ervas ho'oretz BO'SEM." By coming through different entrances you have positioned yourselves to spy, even before entering the city, thus LIROSE before BO'SEM. In verse 12 Yoseif claimed that he had proof of their plans of espionage by virtue of their all going to the area of houses of ill repute. This happened after they had already entered, thus it is expressed as "ervas ho'oretz BO'SEM LIROSE," with their entry mentioned first.

Ch. 42, v. 21: "Avol asheimim anachnu al ochinu asher ro'inu b'tzoras NAFSHO b'his'chan'no ei'leinu v'lo shomonu" - If the brothers already felt pangs of guilt, why not for the sale of Yoseif, rather than the lack of response to his entreaties? Indeed, because of this question Rabbeinu Bachyei joins the camp of commentators who say that the brothers never sold Yoseif, but were only instrumental in his sale. Some "baa'lei mussar" explain this with insight into human nature, saying that even if one coldly calculates to even have someone killed, a most merciless act, when that person is a brother and begs for mercy, some reevaluation is in place. The Ksav Sofer in his responsa O.Ch. # 137 has a completely different understanding of our verse. The M.R. Bmidbar 21:4 says that one who causes his fellow man to sin has done him a greater disservice than had he killed him. Sin destroys one's closeness to Hashem and his reward in the world to come, while killing a person only destroys his existence in this ephemeral world. This is why the gemara B.B. 8b says that all are responsible to help redeem a captured person, "pidyone shvuyim," as the captured person is kept among idol worshippers and will be exposed to their negative ways. The brothers originally planned to kill Yoseif, but later decided to have him sold as a slave to the Yish'm'eilim. This latter plan was more devastating than the former. "Asher ro'inu b'tzoras NAFSHO b'his'chan'no eileinu" means that he beseeched us regarding his NEFESH, his spirituality. If sold to the Yish'm'eilim he feared that he would likely lose his levels of yiras Shomayim, etc. And yet, we did not hearken to his plea, feeling that he only said this to save his physical life. They felt that this was their sin as they saw that a punishment in kind, midoh

K'neged midoh, was unfolding when told that one brother would remain behind in Egypt as a hostage, thus exposing him to the depravities of Egypt. This also answers a question raised by the Ramban in the following verse where we find Reuvaine saying "Ha'lo omarti ..... al techetu va'yeled v'lo shma'tem." He asks that we do not find Reuvaine ever having said these words. (I am surprised at his question, because he himself says that although we do not find earlier that Yoseif begged for his life, the Torah leaves out details in one place and fills them in in another.) Says the Ksav Sofer that since Reuvaine suggested that Yoseif be thrown into a pit (and according to the brothers' understanding be left there to die) he would have died without having been caused to sin by being sold into bondage and being exposed to sinners. This is what is meant by "al TECHETU va'yeled," do not have him sold and thus do not cause him to SIN. Perhaps we can add to this interpretation that the final words of the verse, "v'gam domo hi'nei nidrosh," mean that just as you admit that you were wrong in regard to Yoseif's spiritual murder that you caused, you might also be wrong regarding physically destroying him, "v'gam domo."

Ch. 44, v. 12: "Va'y'CHA'PEIS bagodol heicheil uvakoton kiloh" - Through the rule of "g'zeiroh shovoh," the use of the same words in two different subjects, we derive that a point of information that is clearly shown by one subject also applies to the second. The gemara P'sochim 7b proves that the search for chometz on the night of the eve of Pesach should be done with a single candle with a "g'zeiroh shovoh" of "m'tziah m'tziah, chipus chipus." One of the verses using the word form "chipus," searching, is our verse. The Maharsh"o asks why the gemara didn't use the word form "chipus" found earlier "Va'y'cha'peis v'lo motzo hatrofim" (31:35). 1) He answers that the gemara preferred to compare the word "yimotzei" to "va'yimotzei" rather than "motzo" to "yimotzei." 2) He offers a second answer. By comparing the finding of chometz to a verse in which the party was found guilty, as the goblet was discovered, we can derive that even after one has transgressed the sin of sour dough not being found in one's possession there still is a mitzvoh to search, while if derived from the search Lovon made and did not discover his idols, one would not know that there is a responsibility to search for chometz even during the time of its prohibition. 3) The Chasam Sofer (chidushei P'sochim 7b) answers that the gemara wants to bring a case of searching that is similar to the search for chometz, where one holds the candle and another does the searching. This was not the case by Lovon's searching for his idols. However, here where Yoseif sent Menasheh on Shabbos, as indicated by the words "u'tvo'ach tevach v'hochein" (43:16), that preparation was made on the

eve of Shabbos and they left the next day (M.R. 92:4), "haboker ohr v'ho'anoshim shulchu" (44:3), Menasheh surely didn't hold a candle to illuminate the interior of their satchels, as he kept Shabbos just as his father Yoseif did (M.R. 92:4 and Tanchuma parshas Nasso #33). Obviously someone else must have held the candle while he searched. (Another indication that the pursuer kept Shabbos is the statement of the verse "lo hirschiku" (44:4), indicating that they had not gone beyond the "t'chum," the halachically prescribed boundary, of Shabbos, and Menasheh the pursuer was still able to reach them. Since this scenario most closely resembles the manner in which one searches for chometz, the earlier verse is not used. 4) The Chasam Sofer offers another answer. Since earlier the search was for idols, and if found Lovon would worship them, the gemara did not want to use that verse as a source, since the concept of idol worship is diametrically opposed to the searching for chometz and its eventually being destroyed, symbolic of destruction of idols, "l'haavir gilulim min ho'oretz." 5) The Tchebiner Rov answers with the words of the Ram"o on O.Ch. 432:2, the laws of searching for chometz. The Ram"o writes that there is a custom to place pieces of chometz in various places and include them in the search. (The Taz asks how this is considered a search, knowingly placing chometz.) Since the search for the goblet was for an object that was knowingly placed in a certain location, the gemara prefers to bring a verse that has a similar scenario as the search for chometz.

#### HAFTORAS MIKEITZ 5761 BS"D

Almost always the Haftorah of parshas Mikeitz concedes to the Haftorah of Shabbos Chanukah. Since this year Chanukah ends as Shabbos parshas Mikeitz begins we read Mikeitz's own Haftorah, a rare occurrence. It is the famous story of a most strange case brought before King Shlomo to adjudicate, taking place shortly after he was promised great wisdom by Hashem (M'lochim 1:3:12). The Novi then recounts this most difficult case and how through his exceptional wisdom, King Shlomo brought the truth to light. In short, two women dwelled together in one room and gave birth within three days of each other, each to a boy. The child of one of them unfortunately died. One woman claimed that when the other awoke at night and realized that her son was no longer among the living, she surreptitiously took her dead child and switched it with her own live child. The other claimed that it was not so, but rather, that the other woman's child had died, and that she was lying in an attempt to have the live child for herself. King Shlomo said that the way to resolve this in a "clear cut" manner was to bring him a sword. He proposed to cut the child in half and give each claimant half a child. One

woman unequivocally said that the child should not be cut asunder and she would rather give up her child to the other woman. The second woman responded that she would go along with King Shlomo's suggestion. King Shlomo then said that the woman who adamantly refused to have the child physically divided was the true mother. All of Yisroel heard about the ruling of King Shlomo, and his reputation then spread far and wide (M'lochim 1:3:16-28). There is a most difficult question that any logical reader should have with this story. Although "all's well that ends well" and "hindsight has 20/20 vision," and the false mother showed her true colours, but why did King Shlomo think that the false mother would fall trap into his ruse? Only an exceedingly dimwitted person would agree to have the child cut in two. Wherein lies King Shlomo's wisdom? Three answers to this question are offered, each coming from a different vantage point. 1) An in depth analysis of the semantics of the litigants 2) Important background knowledge about the litigants 3) A totally new approach to what King Shlomo actually proposed when he said that the child be cut in two 1) If we pay close attention to the order of the claims of each woman we see that there is a switch in the order of the two points being claimed by each one. In verse 22 we find, "The other woman said, "It is not as you claim, but rather my son is the live one, and your son is the dead one," and this one said, "It is not as you claim, but rather your son is the dead one, and my son is the live one!" In the next verse King Shlomo verbatim repeats the words of both litigants, only adding on the word "zeh" in the beginning of the words of the first woman. Perhaps ZEH is not part of the quote of the woman's words, but rather a prelude added by King Shlomo, similar to the Ramban's interpretation of LEIMORE, "accurately this." King Shlomo is pointing out to pay close attention to the order of the words, as herein lies the disclosure of who is telling the truth. Another possibility might again be that ZEH is not part of the quote, as we don't find ZEH in the woman's statement in the previous verse. King Shlomo is pointing out that the true mother who said "bni hachai" first, POINTED to the child. We find that ZEH indicates not only meaning THIS, but pointing to it as well, as in the gemara Taanis 25a, in the verse in Yeshayohu 25:9, "Hi'nei Elokeinu ZEH ..... ZEH Hashem kivinu Lo," which the gemara says means that Hashem's presence was so palpable that they pointed to it. As well, on the verse "ZEH Keili Vanveihu" (Shmos 15:2), the M.R. Shmos 23 in the last few lines says that the bnei Yisroel pointed to the almost perceptible presence of Hashem. The child might have had a bit of similarity to his true mother's features and she was not afraid to accentuate this, thus pointing to him while saying that he was her offspring. Not so with the other

claimant. She distanced herself from drawing attention to the child's appearance and did not point to him while she claimed that he was her child. Returning to King Shlomo's repetition of their words, although the M.R. Koheles 10:18 in the name of Rabbi Simone and the gemara Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 3:8 derive from this that a judge must repeat the gist of the words of the litigants to them to clarify if he properly understood their claims, as explained by the Pnei Moshe on the Yerushalmi and as recorded in Choshen Mishpot 17:7, but on a simple "pshuto shel mikro" level, what was the point of his repetition? Perhaps in this lies the insightful wisdom of King Shlomo. Before he even suggested his test he already deduced from the words of the two women who the true mother was. When mentioning two matters, it is human nature to express oneself with the primary weightier matter first and the secondary matter only afterwards. This is pointed out numerous times by the Malbim in his commentary on Megilas Esther. The true mother had but one thing on her mind. I WANT MY CHILD! The woman who knew that her child was dead could not bring it back to life. Her driving force was her unwillingness to see her friend coddle, nurse, and bring up a child, while hers was dead. Her goal in appearing in front of King Shlomo was to stop the other woman from having a child while she would be left without one. Note that the woman mentioned earlier in verse 22 first mentioned that the live child was hers, and only afterwards stated that therefore the dead child must belong to her roommate. The second woman mentioned that the dead child was her friend's before mentioning that the live one was hers. All was thus revealed to King Shlomo and he therefore repeated these key words which revealed the truth. Only because it was a subtle proof did he go on to suggest the "cutting edge" test. Knowing that the false mother was so fixated on the OTHER WOMAN NOT HAVING A CHILD, he felt it was quite safe to assume that this crazed drive would even push her to the point that she would even agree to have the child killed, as long as the other woman would also not have her own live child, as indeed the false mother stated, "gam li gam loch lo y'h'yeh" (verse 26), thus showing her true colours. 2) The M.R. Koheles 10:18, Yalkut Shimoni M'lochim remez #175, and the Medrash Shochar Tov on T'hilim 72 mention an opinion that these two women were involved in a question of YIBUM. The M'iri in his commentary to Y'vomos 17b says that these two women were a mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law, and that both of their husbands were deceased, thus rendering them as candidates for "yibum" or "chalitzoh." It is in place to mention some laws of YIBUM, a levirate marriage. If there are paternal brothers and one of them dies without children, the wife of the deceased man may not marry just

any man, as would another widow. Her brother-in-law must either marry her, i.e. perform "yibum," or if he does not want to marry her then the Torah calls for a ritual called "chalitzoh" where she removes his shoe from his foot and spits in front of him, proclaiming, "Such shall be done to the man who will not build his brother's house" (D'vorim 25:5,7,9), and she is then released to marry anyone. If the deceased husband does not leave behind a living brother his widow may marry anyone (Y'vomos 17b). As mentioned, "yibum" or "chalitzoh" only apply when a man dies childless. This is so even when a man once had children, but the children were no longer living at the time of his own death (Y'vomos 87b). However, if the deceased man left behind no living children but did leave behind another living descendant, i.e. a grandchild, he is not considered to be childless and neither "yibum" nor "chalitzoh" are done and the widow is free to marry anyone (Y'vomos 70a). This is true not only if the offspring was already born, but even if the offspring is still unborn but is a fetus at the time of the man's death, and his widow would be exempted from being bound to the living brother (Y'vomos 22b, 35b). However, this is only true when the offspring is viable, a "bar kayomo." If the fetus is stillborn or born alive but dies or is killed before remaining alive for thirty days, it is not considered a viable child and "yibum" or "chalitzoh" must be performed (Y'vomos 111b). The next point of information is a most pivotal one when it will be applied to our story of the two women. If the brother of the deceased is a minor, "yibum" or "chalitzoh" must still be performed. The caveat is that we must wait until he becomes 13 years old for either of these two procedures, not a major issue if he would be approaching bar-mitzvah age at the time of his childless brother's demise, but a major problem if he is a newborn at the time of his brother's death, as either of these two procedures must be performed by adults (Y'vomos 105b). The widow would be LOCKED IN almost 13 years, waiting for either "yibum" or "chalitzoh," if her brother-in-law was a newborn at the time of her husband's death. Let us return to the case brought in front of King Shlomo, armed with this information. The mother-in-law had no other children besides the baby boy in question, because if she did, she would not be subject to either "yibum" or "chalitzoh." As well, if she had another son, her daughter-in-law would be subject to "yibum" or "chalitzoh" by virtue of this other brother-in-law, unless the daughter-in-law convinced King Shlomo that the child was hers, giving her deceased husband the status of one who died leaving behind a child, and thus releasing her. The daughter-in-law had no other children or else she would not be subject to "yibum" or "chalitzoh" because her deceased husband left over this other child. Now we can

appreciate the ramifications of the outcome of King Shlomo's ruling. If the daughter-in-law would be judged to be the childless woman, she would not only lose the baby, but would also be subject to "yibum" or "chalitzoh." In this case it would be devastating, as the boy was a newborn and if he was the son of the mother-in-law, i.e. a brother-in-law of the daughter-in-law, she would have to wait 13 years for either of the two rituals to be performed. Although both gave birth to babies, they were less than thirty days old at the time that one of them died, not a "bar kayomo," as the verse indicates. The mother of the dead child would therefore be subject to the laws of "yibum" and "chalitzoh." This was the motivation of the lying mother, the daughter-in-law, to try to convince King Shlomo that it was her son, thus relieving her of either "yibum" or "chalitzoh" for two reasons. There is no brother-in-law of her deceased husband, and her husband did not die childless. This is only true regarding the daughter-in-law. However, if it were the mother-in-law's child who had died, she would have no reason to claim her daughter-in-law's child as her own to exempt her from "yibum" or "chalitzoh." If her husband passed away before her son, the husband of the second woman, she is released from "yibum" or "chalitzoh," as her deceased husband died while leaving over a live child over the age of thirty days (Y'vomos 87a). Even if her son had passed away before her husband had, leaving him childless at the time of his death, she would still be exempt from "yibum" or "chalitzoh" for a different reason. The living child, even if he were not her own child, was still her son's son, and a grandchild also exempts her from "yibum" or "chalitzoh." This does create a bit of difficulty for the M'iri who states that they were a mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law, as only the daughter-in-law could possibly be a "y'vomoh," and the Medrash states that they were BOTH "y'vomos." We would have to stretch the intention of the Medrash to mean that they were both INVOLVED in a case of possible "yibum." Only the daughter-in-law would have a compelling motive to falsely claim that the child was hers. If it was her son who died within 30 days from his birth, she would be bound to her husband's brother, this newborn boy, for "yibum" or "chalitzoh," which requires a wait of almost 13 years under the circumstances! King Shlomo with his phenomenal Divinely inspired wisdom grasped all the above. He realized that the only one with a compelling motive to lie was the daughter-in-law and that likely the child really belonged to the mother-in-law. In order to confirm this conclusion he ordered that the child be cut in two. If the baby would be killed this would accomplish a tremendous release of obligation for the daughter-in-law since the living baby was her one and only brother-in-law. Originally she hoped to convince King

Shlomo that the child was hers and this would release her from "yibum" or "chalitzoh." Even though she knew that in fact she was not free to marry whomever she wished, as this was not her child, she was either willing to sin as long as she wasn't bound for thirteen years, or perhaps, she would conveniently arrange for him to later "die." King Shlomo's suggestion played wonderfully into her hands, she thought, as by killing this child it would truly release her of any halachic obligation, as there would be no brother-in-law to tie her down to "yibum" or "chalitzoh." Now we see why it was logical for King Shlomo to think that she would fall for his plan and agree to have the child killed, and he thus exposed her as the liar that she was. 3) The Moshav Z'keinim offers a new interpretation of King Shlomo's suggestion into cutting the baby in half. Although the verse indicates that King Shlomo's wisdom became widespread knowledge after this incident (M'lochim 1:3:28), nevertheless we have an indication that he let it be known that Hashem had bestowed upon his a great measure of Divine wisdom when he came to Yerusholayim in front of the Holy Ark and offered many sacrifices and held great festivities in appreciation of the great gift he had received, extreme wisdom. Given this reputation, King Shlomo said that he could not conclude as to who was the truthful woman and offered to dissect the baby in such a manner that each part would remain alive, recovering from the procedure. Although no one had ever heard of such a thing taking place before, King Shlomo with his reputation as the most knowledgeable of all men stated that he could do it, a first in the Guinness World Book of Records. The bereaved mother readily agreed, as she had no great compassion for the child who was not really the fruit of her womb. She gullibly believed King Shlomo and felt she had nothing to lose. The true mother, however, reacted as any true mother would. She said that she did not rely on King Shlomo's wisdom to perform such a delicate procedure successfully, and stated that she would rather give up the child to the other woman than to so greatly risk his life. I believe that this interpretation of the Moshav Z'keinim can be found in the above-mentioned M.R. Koheles 10:18 as well as the other Medroschim mentioned above. It first brings the command of King Shlomo to sever the child in two, and then states that King Shlomo flowed with wisdom saying, "Did Hashem create man with two eyes, two nostrils, two ears, two hands, two feet per person if not for His seeing into the future that this case would happen?" These words seem to have no meaning, nor relevance. It seems that the Moshav Z'keinim understood this to mean that King Shlomo said that he was capable of severing the child in two, leaving over in each one of the children one of the above-mentioned organs, and both children would be viable.

Thus he expected the false mother to accept this offer. An independent interesting aside: There is an opinion that King Shlomo actually planned to carry through and have the child cut in half. After the statement of the Medrash that King Shlomo flowed with words of wisdom the Medrash reiterates the words in the Novi that King Shlomo commanded that the child be cut in two. The Medrash then continues, saying in the name of Rabbi Yehudoh b'R l'lo'i that had he been present at the court hearing he would have taken a cord of wool and strangled King Shlomo for doing this. (This is in compliance with the gemara Sanhedrin 84b that a judge who rules improperly deserves the punishment of "chenek.") Why was Rabbi Yehudoh b'R l'lo'i's statement not placed earlier, the first time it was mentioned that King Shlomo said to cut the child in two? It seems that until the Medrash mentioned the idea of double organs it was understood that King Shlomo never planned to have the baby killed. Only when the new concept of double organs was mentioned, which indicated that he planned to have the baby cut in two vertically and leave over one of each organ in each half, did Rabbi Yehudoh b'R l'lo'i understand that he actually planned to carry through, with his expectation that each half would be viable. It was only at this point that Rabbi Yehudoh b'R l'lo'i responded so sharply. I'd like to leave you with a question. We see from the explanation of the M'iri that King Shlomo's decision of who was the true mother encompasses more than just child custody, as he ruled that the daughter-in-law required "yibum" or "chalitzoh." However, according to the two other explanations of King Shlomo's ruling, was it halachically decided who the baby's mother was regarding all matters, i.e. regarding restriction of marriage to relatives, ch"v hitting a parent, inheritance, status as a Kohein, Levi, or Yisroel, or only a decision regarding child custody? The Sfes Emes wrote that there are so many opinions explaining the sin of Moshe at Mei M'rivoh (Bmidbar 20:7-13) because it is beyond us to comprehend Moshe's sin. If we mere mortals would be capable of grasping the sin of Moshe, the holiest of all men, he surely would not have fallen victim to it. Similarly, we might be able to say that there is much work involved to comprehend the intention and wisdom of King Shlomo, as he was the wisest of all men.

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**RavFrand**

From Rabbi Yissocher Frand  
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Chicken and Egg Situation: Cause and Effect Not All Its Cracked Up To Be

"And it was after two years, Pharaoh is dreaming that he was standing on the banks of the Nile" [Bereshis 41:1]. There is a grammatical problem in this pasuk [verse]. Had we been telling the story, the verb 'chalam' (dream) would have been written in the past tense (Pharaoh cholam - dreamt) rather than the way the Torah actually records it (Pharaoh choleim - is dreaming), in the present tense.

The Shemen haTov gives an insightful explanation for this grammatical problem, providing an important lesson in Torah philosophy. Many times it is important to ask the question "What came first - the chicken or the egg?". In other words, in any given set of circumstances one can analyze what is the cause and what is the effect. Which one is which may not always be obvious.

Without the benefit of the Mesorah -- the oral explanation of the Torah passed down by our Sages -- a person might understand the story of Yosef being released from prison as follows: Yosef was stuck in jail. All of a sudden the King of Egypt had a dream. He did not know what it meant. None of his wise men could explain it to him satisfactorily. Finally, one of the king's advisers remembered there was a prisoner in jail who was very good at interpreting dreams. They brought Yosef out of jail, he explained the dream, he was made the viceroy, etc., etc.

In this scenario, the cause of Yosef's release from prison was Pharaoh's dream. What would have happened if Pharaoh had not remembered his dream? For all we know, Yosef would still be stuck there in prison. This is the "secular" way of viewing this Biblical incident.

The way our Sages view this story, the sequence of events and the whole chain of cause and effect were totally different: Yosef was supposed to be in prison. He was supposed to go free 2 years earlier. But, because - as we learned in last week's Parsha - Yosef asked the butler to remember him to the King (an inappropriate act of putting his faith in man rather than in G-d, for someone on Yosef's spiritual level), two years were added to his sentence.

But when those two years were over, it was time for Yosef to go free. G-d wanted him released. The prison sentence was complete. Yosef had to be released from prison because, according to the Divine Master plan, he was the one who was eventually going to sustain Egypt and sustain the whole world, forcing his brothers to come down to Egypt. Therefore, the cause was the need to implement the Divine plan and the result was that Pharaoh had to start dreaming. Pharaoh's dream did not cause Yosef to be released from prison. On the contrary, G-d's plan to free Yosef from prison caused Pharaoh to dream.

This is hinted at by the unique grammatical construction of the pasuk quoted above. Had the pasuk been written in the past tense -- "And Pharaoh had a dream" -- that would have left us with the impression that Pharaoh's dream triggered the sequence of events - as if the dream caused everything else to happen. The Torah is telling us that Pharaoh's dream was only the result. The time had come for Pharaoh to start dreaming (present tense) because of the need to implement G-d's Master plan.

Over the last few years we have witnessed earth-shattering events. It is very difficult to define history after the passage of only a few short years. But, nevertheless, I would just like to suggest an alternate interpretation.

The secular interpretation: The leader of the Soviet Union was a fellow named Mikhail Gorbachev. He saw that the Soviet economy was not working. It needed the infusion of Western capital and expertise. Therefore, he introduced this idea called Perestroika in order to get Western aid. But he knew that in order to 'play ball' with the West he had to relax emigration restrictions on the Jews. Therefore, along with Perestroika came a loosening of the chains that kept the Jews in Russia. However, Perestroika got out of hand and once the 'genie got out of the bottle' things began to unravel. Ultimately the whole country began to unravel. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Jews were able to go free. This is the secular view of history.

An alternative interpretation is as follows: G-d in his Wisdom, wanted Jews to be in Russia for X number of years. G-d promised us "If your dispersed shall be in the uttermost parts of Heaven, from there the L-rd your G-d will gather you in and from there he will take you out." [Devorim 39:4] We were promised that in the End of the Days there would be an ingathering of the exiles. G-d knew that there were three million Jews in a prison called the Soviet Union. (We are not talking about an individual Yosef; we are talking about a nation in prison.) G-d said, "It is time for them to come out." And it came to pass at the end of -- not two years, but at the end of seventy years of Communism -- that G-d decided that Jews must go free. Therefore, G-d began the chain of events of history, starting with Gorbachev's calculations about the Soviet economy, etc., etc. The exodus of the Jews was not the result of the whole chain of events -- it was the cause of the whole chain of subsequent events.

This is the difference between the secular view of world history and the Jewish view of world history. Whether I am right or wrong, whether this is an accurate reading of the events of the early 1990s, I do not know. I am neither a historian nor a prophet and I do not want to take that responsibility.

I am merely offering an alternative explanation. I do not attest to the exact

sequence of events. But I do attest to the idea that what we see as the Cause may be the Effect.

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## Drasha

From Rabbi Mordechai Kamenetzky  
 <[rmk@torah.org](mailto:rmk@torah.org)>

Parshas Miketz -- Associated Press

In what is perhaps the greatest and the most radical transformation in history, Yoseph is extracted from his dungeon-like jail cell where he languished as an accused felon, denounced as a disloyal slave and a back-stabbing ingrate and elevated into one of the most powerful leaders in ancient history.

How did it all happen? It began one night when Pharaoh dreamt two successive, strange dreams. In each, puny and undernourished organisms, in one-dream bovines, in another ears on stalks, literally devoured well-fed and succulent counterparts in their respective species. What intensified the mystery, was that no apparent change occurred to either the cows or the ears. They remained just as emaciated as they were at the beginning of the episode.

Despite their presumed ability to ponder the unknown and interpret the unexplainable mysteries of life, Pharaoh's sorcerers were dumfounded. It took the prodding of Pharaoh's disgraced butler to haul Yoseph from prison and present him before Pharaoh as the one man who was a true dream-interpreter with the veracity of his predictions proven by the butler's very presence.

And so Yoseph was brought in front of Pharaoh and with G-d's help, Yoseph enlightened him, interpreting the succulent stalks and cows as representing seven years of plenty, followed by seven ensuing years of drought, gloom and famine which would consume the bounty. Pharaoh liked his explanations and made Yoseph the viceroy saying, "Since G-d has informed you of all this, there can be no one so discerning and wise as you. You shall be in charge of my palace; by your command shall all my people be sustained; only by the throne shall I outrank you" (Genesis 41:39-40). In addition, he followed Yoseph's ensuing plan of action, in preparation for the boom and the bust.

The Torah tells us that the predictions came true. It relates the story through Egyptian eyes. It tells of their reaction to

plenty and to shortage. It tells how they stored the grain in the years of plenty in preparation for the lean years.

But look at the way the tale is related: Contrast the description of the good and the bad years. First the plenty: "The earth produced during the seven years of abundance by the handfuls" (ibid v. 47). The Torah then tells us how the Egyptians gathered grain and stored it in preparation for the ensuing famine. Then it tells us how the good times came to a halt: "The seven years of abundance that came to pass in the land of Egypt ended." Then the bad news: "And the seven years of famine began approaching just as Yoseph had said" (ibid v. 53-54).

Note it does not say the good years came "just as Yoseph said," Yoseph's predictions are only associated with disaster. Why?

The late physicist, Albert Einstein delivered a discourse on his theory of relativity at the prestigious Sorbonne. After reviewing his theory and its ramifications on the physics theory in particular and the future of civilization, he ended his speech, "If my theory is proven correct, the French will say I am a citizen of the world and the Germans will say I am a German. If I am wrong, the French will say I am a German and the Germans will say I am a Jew."

Rabbi Reines, the Lida Rav, commented how even in the ancient story of plenty and famine, the Torah relates it through the eyes of those who have experienced it. When it came to the good years, well, they just came. When the suffering began, however, it was "just as the Jew said."

The years of plenty came and went unassociated with the man who foretold its arrival. However when the famine came the suffering and the misery came exactly as the Hebrew slave had predicted. Funny isn't it, how only the famine came just as the Jew predicted, but the years of plenty were only associated by an accident of nature.

How often do we hear the news of criminal suspects described in the vaguest terms, obscuring their ethnicity, skin color, or national origin? Yet when it comes to a man who professes to observe the Torah, or even hails from a lineage of those who did, we hear the word Jew associated with the purported act. Though the philosophy of Judaism transcends any physical characteristics, and yet for some odd reason it becomes so distinguishable when associated with the specificity of bad news. Whether it is the fall of the economy or the inclement weather, there will always, someone, somewhere who will link it to the Jew. Somehow, the faith of the solitary nation plays out in more than their prayers. But that day will pass, when the light unto the nations illuminates their attitude and there will be something more to bad news, than Jews. ©2000 Rabbi Mordechai Kamenetzky

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### LifeLine

From Project Genesis  
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The Chanukah Menorah, with its eight lights and additional "shamash" from which we light the others, is an extremely common Jewish symbol. In Jewish homes across America, in public squares, even on television or Internet, we see how it is used: on the first night, we light only one light (in addition to the shamash), adding an additional light each night until we light eight one week later.

In Jewish law, what we do is called "Hiddur Mitzvah," beautifying the Mitzvah. The basic requirement for Chanukah is merely to light a single light during each of the eight nights of the holiday. If a person does not have enough oil (or candles) on the 8th night for eight lights, he or she lights only one. This is sufficient to fulfill the Mitzvah. But today it is quite universal to perform this "Hiddur."

Imagine, then, the following situation: you have precisely enough lights to last you through the holiday. Your friend, however, has no oil at all. If you give him or her oil, then you will lose the opportunity to beautify the Mitzvah on the 8th and even the 7th day. What should you do?

Answer: Jewish law requires you to share your oil. Helping another person to fulfill the Mitzvah itself takes precedence over your own opportunity to beautify the Mitzvah.

In the Torah, Parshas Noach, we learn that Noach had three sons: Shem, Cham, and Yafes. Noach blesses Yafes by saying "may G-d grow Yafes, and he will dwell in the Tents of Shem." Yafes was the "father" of the arts, of beauty (from the same root as "yaffa," beautiful). Our Sages interpret this blessing as saying, he and his talents should grow, but they should be used within the tents of Shem.

Shem, from whom the Jewish people descend, was the scholar of the three. His name literally means "name" -- and the Sages teach that the Hebrew name of a thing defines its essence ("...and G-d brought [the creatures] to Adam to see what he would call them, and anything that Adam called a creature, that is its name" [Gen. 2:19]). Beauty, aesthetics have a purpose, when they dwell within and are subservient to the essence.

Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb points out that questions of beauty have no relevance when factual questions, truth and falsehood, are at stake. If I enjoy looking at the Mona Lisa and you do not, neither of us is wrong. If we are solving a mathematical equation, however, then -- because there is, in fact, one correct answer -- one of us

(or both) may be wrong. No matter how beautiful or elegant we may find the statement "two plus two equals five," it's not the right answer. We cannot give dosages of medicine based upon the relative beauty of the numbers or equations involved. The design of an aircraft or car can be beautiful, but it first must be able to travel in order to be a viable candidate for purchase. If a "car" is a vehicle able to carry you around, you will first want to know that it can move before considering the aesthetics of the metal and paint job.

The Greeks represented the pinnacle of philosophy and art in their day, but they elevated art to an end in itself, to a supreme value. They considered the human body an object of beauty (the original Olympics were run in the nude), and for this reason considered circumcision a disgrace. Divine Wisdom was subjugated to beauty. The war of the Chashmonaim against the Greeks was a war between Truth and Beauty as absolute values.

The truth of the matter is that this battle has not ended. I do not understand those who suggest looking at the Jewish Mitzvos, or Commandments, and asking, "do I feel Commanded by this Mitzvah?" If it is indeed a Commandment, then my feelings cannot be the issue. "Sergeant, I know you told us to hike five miles, but I didn't feel commanded by that." "Sorry officer, but I don't really feel Commanded by the speed limits." We do not live our lives looking at the aesthetics of laws and orders -- human laws we try to change, but we encourage civil disobedience only when we believe that a law is unjust in absolute terms, not simply because we don't appreciate its beauty. So why do people look at Jewish law differently?

The answer is that people have simply set aside the "truth" question in favor of beauty (see also Eytan Kobre's "Suddenly Sinai" on our web site, as linked above). This is very unfortunate.

The "truth" is that Judaism is indeed beautiful. And it is beautiful precisely because it functions within the bounds of absolute principles. I cannot be selfishly concerned only with my own mitzvah -- I must be concerned about my friend's mitzvah as well. I must, in fact, sacrifice the beauty of my mitzvah in order to enable my friend to perform the mitzvah itself.

And that, of course, is the greatest beauty of all.

Good Shabbos and a Happy Chanukah,  
Rabbi Yaakov Menken

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### Haftorah

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Parshas Miketz M'lochim I, 3:15 by Rabbi Dovid Siegel

This week's haftorah reveals to us the extent one can be driven when plagued with jealousy. The haftorah relates the first court decision the wise Shlomo Hamelech rendered after assuming the mantle of leadership. It tells of two women who shared an apartment and had both given birth at the same time. Unfortunately, misfortune struck one of them and her child died in his sleep. One of the women claimed that her child was actually kidnapped by the other woman and replaced by the woman's dead child and the other totally denied the accusation. Shlomo Hamelech immediately ordered for a sword to be brought and that the live child be divided equally amongst the two women. The true mother cried out and pleaded with the king that the child be spared and given to the other mother. But the latter calmly accepted the judgement and agreed to the slicing of the child. Shlomo immediately ruled that the woman who frantically expressed her compassion was the child's true mother.

This incident exposes the true ugly character of jealousy and demonstrate show corrupt it can be. It is most amazing to think that Shlomo Hamelech would actually rely upon this scheme and be confident that the truth would result from it. One could question, "After all, even if it were not her child, where is human compassion?" In addition, wouldn't one expect the imposter to act out her role to perfection? Obviously, no true mother would ever permit her own child to be sliced in front of her very own eyes. Didn't the kidnapper realize that she was revealing her true identity through this absolutely inexcusable behavior?

We must conclude from this that we totally underestimate the savage feeling of jealousy. Firstly, our understanding of this horrible drive is that one merely wants something belonging to another. In truth it is much greater than that and is rooted in an inner need for absolute equality with another. A jealous person can not tolerate the fact that someone else has more than him and is compelled, at all costs, to be on par with that other person. In his mind it doesn't really matter whether they both possess the article or neither, what really counts is that they are equal!

The Malbim highlights this thought through the analysis of the exact wording in each woman's claim. The Scriptures state, "One woman said, 'No, my son is the live one and yours is dead' and the other said, 'No, your son is dead and mine is alive.'" (M'lochim I, 3:22) The Malbim notes the different priorities in the two women's statements. The first woman prioritized the live being of her son and the other prioritized the death of her friend's son. This subtlety revealed the true intention of the imposter.

What disturbed her was that the live child belonged to someone else while her own child had died. What she couldn't tolerate was the fact that her friend would enjoy her own child and she could not. Therefore it didn't really matter whether she would receive the live child or not; as long as he wouldn't be given to her friend she would be content. Shlomo Hamelech listened carefully to her words and discovered her true focus and concern. He therefore put her through this test and anticipated with confidence that her true motivation and interest would surface. And so it was. In effect she was caught off guard and without even contemplating the consequences of her statement she told it how it was. Once she heard the soothing words of equality, "Both or neither" she was perfectly content and, without thinking, agreed to Shlomo Hamelech's horrifying verdict.

The upshot of this is that jealousy means one's inability to accept that fact that one can possess that which he doesn't. Although it translates into a "sincere" interest in obtaining that very same article this interest is actually rooted in a base desire for absolute equality. This hidden reality exposes itself when one finds himself mysteriously calmed after his friend has unfortunately lost the coveted article. Suddenly the drive is gone and one no longer seems to need the article his friend once possessed. The imposter in today's haftorah lived with this real feeling of jealousy and saw things in their true perspective. When presented with a "fair" solution to her problem, she forgot to translate her jealousy into a positive interest, the well being of the baby, and left it as a savage need for equality. Shlomo Hamelech made contact with her true inner drive and when she was caught off guard she fell right into the trap.

This fundamental understanding of jealousy opens our eyes to the painful national experience of Yosef and the Ten Tribes. In Parshas Vayeishev the Torah reveals the underlying cause for the sale of Yosef. "And the brothers were jealous of Him." (Breishis 37:11) Yosef was the privileged character in the household of Yaakov rapidly establishing superiority and the brothers resented this. They actually felt physically threatened by Yosef's rise to power and sought ample protection from him. Although they felt justified in what they had done (see comments of Sforno to verse 37:18) they did not realize that, in truth, they were being driven to their conclusion by base jealousy. However, jealousy should motivate one to attempt to obtain the same item, or in this case to rise to a similar position of power. Yet, we discover that their response to this jealousy was quite the contrary. Instead of attempting to perfect themselves and be deemed worthy of a similar status to that of Yosef, the brothers were compelled to

remove Yosef from the scene. Was this jealousy or basic beast-like hatred?

In light of this week's haftorah we gain a glimpse into the brother's behavior. As proven above, jealousy means a non-compromising stand for absolute equality without tolerating anyone to possess that which I don't have. It really doesn't matter if I achieve an equal status or if he is demoted from his superior position, all that counts is that we're equal and he's not ahead. The brothers, although not realizing it, could not tolerate their younger brother as a superior over them. There was therefore no drive for the position of superiority because their true desire wasn't status but rather equality, that no one should be ahead of them. This unfortunately slanted their perception about Yosef and ultimately justified them in their position of removing him from his superiority over them. The results of this ugly trait were devastating to the morale of the Jewish people and could not be rectified until the martyrdom of the righteous ten holy martyrs during and after the era of the Second Temple. May we merit the speedy arrival of Mashiach and the day when this and all other character flaws will be removed from the world, forever.

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### Rabbi Wein

From Rabbi Berel Wein  
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#### Chanukah

The uniqueness of the holiday of Chanuka is apparent in the fact that it is so widely celebrated amongst the Jews the world over and no matter what their level of Jewish observance is. It is not only that Chanuka has the "good fortune" of always falling in the month of December that accounts for this level of interest in it. This is definitely a factor, but I do not believe it to be the deciding factor. I think rather that Chanuka represents the last refuge of Jews who want to be Jewish but are unable to verbalize or express in their actions that inner desire. So, Jews allow Chanuka to speak for us. For Chanuka declares clearly that there is a God in the world, that there are basic principles of faith and godly behavior that are worth great sacrifices, that a little light can overcome a sea of darkness and that God demands a certain greatness from the Jewish people and He will perform miracles to guarantee human realization of His presence in world events.

Jews really believe in these ideas but somehow they are not publicly expressed in our lives. It may be that in our modern world that has cast away so much of the positive of the past, it is embarrassing to mouth these eternal truths. Certainly in this century when Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler and other representatives of the new, modern, progressive world, were ascendant, the lights of Chanuka were certainly dim and the ideas they represented were only capable of being whispered but not proclaimed. So the Jewish person retreated into Chanuka and let the holiday itself speak for them and their inner being and hopes.

One of the qualities of Chanuka, which the Talmud emphasizes, is the concept of *pirsuma nissa* - the requirement to publicize and make known the miracle of Chanuka. Thus the lights of Chanuka are lit in a window that opens to the outside street. In Israel we light the lights of Chanuka in the passageway of our outside doors so that they shine on the street and the passerbys. The lights of Chanuka, the symbol of the miracle and the lessons of this holiday, thereby become a public statement of Jewish faith and of our deepest instincts and godly intuition. What we cannot say in words, either out of ignorance, shame, or weakness, we say therefore with the lights of Chanuka themselves.

The problems in Jewish life that Chanuka records for us are still present today in the Jewish world. The Hellenistic Jews no longer go by that name but their program of advocating unchecked Jewish assimilation, no matter what the cost, still lives on. There are other Jews in our time that advocate putting all of our trust in our own might and power, even though all of the history of the events of this bloody century seem to deny the validity of such a strategy. There are still other Jews that are blind to the realities of being subjugated and are unappreciative of the benefits, spiritual and physical, of being an independent nation. All of these groups existed within the Jewish world of the Hasmoneans almost twenty-two centuries ago. The victory and miracles of Chanuka stand as a stark reminder to all of us that we have been through this trial once before. A wise people learn from its past history. Chanuka and its lights are a powerful memory aid for all of us.

The Torah records for us in this week's reading the story of the fulfillment of Yosef's dreams. The Torah reading of Miketz almost invariably coincides with the Sabbath of Chanuka. The message here is also clear. Chanuka and Jewish dreams are inseparable. In order to have a meaningful, spiritual, Jewish life, one must be a dreamer. One must have a maximum vision of one's self and one's importance and contributions to Jewish life and destiny. Without that vision, it is difficult to appreciate the lights of Chanuka. For

Chanuka not only commemorates our past, it is meant to illustrate our future. It gives hope for our dreams' fulfillment and a sense of confidence - Jewish confidence - that somehow all will yet be right for us and for all of humankind.

Happy Chanuka. Rabbi Berel Wein

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